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Superstar Cities†
By Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai*
We document large long-run differences in average house price 
appreciation across metropolitan areas over the past 50 years, and 
show they can be explained by an inelastic supply of land in some 
unique locations combined with an increasing number of high-
income households nationally. The resulting high house prices and 
price-to-rent ratios in those “superstar” areas crowd out lower 
income households. The same forces generate a similar pattern 
among municipalities within a metropolitan area. These facts suggest 
that disparate local house price and income trends can be driven by 
aggregate demand, not just changes in local factors such as produc-
tivity or amenities. (JEL R11, R23, R31, R52)
A striking feature of urban housing markets after World War II is the considerable dispersion across US metropolitan areas and towns in long-run real house price 
appreciation rates. In Figure 1, which plots the kernel density of average annual real 
house price growth between 1950 and 2000 for 280 US metropolitan areas, average 
real house price appreciation ranged from about 0.2 percent to over 3.8 percent per 
year, with an especially thick right tail of growth rates above 2.6 percent.1 This dis-
tribution is not an artifact of a few small areas that grew very rapidly. For example, 
Table 1, which reports the annualized house price growth rates for the top and bot-
tom ten Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with populations above 500,000 in 
1950, shows that San Francisco enjoyed an average annualized real house price 
appreciation rate of more than 3.5  percent. By contrast, Buffalo realized barely 
0.5 percent average annual real price growth.
1 The census data underlying these figures is described more fully below. All monetary amounts are in con-
stant 2000 dollars throughout the paper. The 280 metropolitan areas in Figure 1 had populations of at least 50,000 
in 1950.
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These differences in long-run rates of appreciation led to an ever-widening gap in 
the price of housing between the most expensive metropolitan areas and the average 
ones. Figure 2 plots the distribution of log mean real house values across metropoli-
tan areas in 1950 and 2000. In 1950, house prices in the most expensive cities were 
twice the national average. By 2000, the gap had risen to four times the national aver-
age. A similar evolution occurred between 1970 and 2000 among US municipalities.
Why house price dispersion has increased so much over such a long time span is 
not well understood. Standard compensating differential models in urban economics 
attribute differences in house prices across markets to differences in the economic 
value to a household from living in one MSA versus another, with that value driven 
by factors such as inherent local productivity (and thus wages), amenities, or fiscal 
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Figure 1. Density of 1950 –2000 Annualized Real House Price Growth Rates 
across MSAs with 1950 Population > 50,000
Table 1— Real Annualized House Price Growth, 1950 –2000, 
Top and Bottom Ten MSAs with 1950 Population >500,000
Top ten MSAs by price growth:
Annualized growth rate, 1950 –2000
Bottom ten MSAs by price growth:
Annualized growth rate, 1950 –2000
San Francisco 3.53 San Antonio 1.13
Oakland 2.82 Milwaukee 1.06
Seattle 2.74 Pittsburgh 1.02
San Diego 2.61 Dayton 0.99
Los Angeles 2.46 Albany (NY) 0.97
Portland (OR) 2.36 Cleveland 0.91
Boston 2.30 Rochester (NY) 0.89
Bergen-Passaic (NJ) 2.19 Youngstown-Warren 0.81
Charlotte 2.18 Syracuse 0.67
New Haven 2.12 Buffalo 0.54
Population-weighted average of the 48 MSAs in this sample: 1.71
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policies.2 Differences across markets in the elasticity of housing supply also could 
lead to differences in capitalization into land prices. However, in order to extrapo-
late this cross-sectional logic to explain differences in house price growth, long-run 
house price appreciation rates would have to be matched by long-run changes in 
local productivity, amenities, or housing supply elasticities. There is little empirical 
evidence on whether that is the case.3
In this paper, we propose a simple mechanism that generates dispersion in 
long-run house price growth rates without relying on persistent changes over time 
in local fundamentals or people’s tastes over where to live. Instead, we show 
that when households have constant preferences over location—perhaps due to 
cross-sectional differences in local amenities, productivity, or fiscal policies, or to 
heterogeneity in household tastes for local features—and the supply of places to live 
is not perfectly elastic everywhere, a change in aggregate housing demand is mani-
fested in different local house price growth rates and yields a changing composition 
of local resident populations.
Locations that experience persistently high house price growth relative to hous-
ing unit growth are called “superstars.” Two traits are critical to a location being a 
2 Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) provide the classic formulation using wages and natural amenities. Amenities 
could also include consumption agglomerations, such as in Waldfogel (2003), or local fiscal policy such as in Epple 
and Sieg (1999).
3 Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) find that the dispersion in metropolitan area-level wages has been large 
enough to account for the spatial distribution in house prices from 1975–2004, but they do not link growth in wages 
and growth in house prices at the individual MSA level. In addition, there is no evidence that amenities grow at 
different rates over long periods of time. Natural amenities such as the weather or physical traits such as coastal 
location clearly do not. Consumption agglomerations have been estimated only in the cross section (Waldfogel 
2003). Nor is there any evidence that household valuations of a given amenity have increased (e.g., see Glaeser and 
Tobio 2008 on the rise of the South).
Figure 2. Density of Mean House Values across MSAs (1950 versus 2000)
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superstar. There must be some inelasticity to its supply of housing. And, it must be 
preferred by a large enough share of the population that it has excess demand.
This simple mechanism yields several powerful implications. First, incremen-
tal differentiation across locations can yield outsized differences in house price 
growth.4 This means that the gap in house prices between cities or towns can keep 
increasing even when the inherent value of any particular location is constant, 
the housing supply has not become more inelastic, and the willingness to pay for 
each location by any individual family is unchanged. When the number of high-
income families grows nationally, the number of households who would like to 
reside in any given community increases, and the aggregate willingness to pay for 
expensive locations rises (presuming the distribution of households’ preferences 
over where to live is constant). If the growth in latent housing demand for a par-
ticular location exceeds the growth in local housing supply due to supply inelas-
ticity, housing rents must rise to clear the market, with lower income households 
crowded out by higher income households.
Second, our mechanism implies that a change in the house price induces a change 
in the local income distribution. This is in contrast to prior research which assumes 
that local productivity growth yields higher wages that are then capitalized into 
house prices. In our model, land prices act as a clearing mechanism by which higher 
income households crowd out lower income households from a scarce location. As 
the number of high-income families grows nationally, existing residents of supply 
constrained areas are outbid by even higher income families, raising the price of land 
yet further. This process induces a shift to the right in the local income distribution.
Third, the dispersion in expected house price growth rates should yield differ-
ences in the price-to-rent ratio for houses. If home buyers in superstar cities expect 
their houses to appreciate over the long run, they should be willing to pay more 
(relative to the rental service flow), today. Of course, in asset market equilibrium, 
superstar locations do not necessarily have higher risk-adjusted returns. Rather, they 
are like growth stocks in the sense that higher expected capital gains come at the 
expense of lower dividend (implicit rent) yields.
Although these implications hold qualitatively as long as housing supply is not 
perfectly elastic, the elasticity of housing supply in superstar cities—or the difficulty 
of constructing substitute locations—is a key determinant of their magnitudes. If 
housing is easily built either in a locality or in a close substitute, there should be 
little superstar effect. As it becomes more difficult to build new housing or replicate 
expensive cities, the excess price growth and subsequent shifts in the income distri-
bution can be large.
We use US Census Bureau data from 1950 –2000 at the metropolitan area and 
municipality levels to test the implications of our model. Our main empirical result 
4 Our “superstars” terminology is a nod to Rosen’s (1981) classic paper on the economics of superstars in the 
sense that, as the market becomes larger, people pay ever more for slight differences across locations. However, in 
Rosen’s (1981) seminal work, a superstar reaps outsized rewards because an incremental improvement in quality 
yields large increases in market share. In our model, incremental differences among locations yield an increasing 
house price premium for superstar cities despite declining market share. As the population grows, the market for a 
differentiated city becomes ever more rarified. In that way, our model is more in keeping with scarce luxury goods 
than Rosen’s (1981) concept of a superstar.
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exploits the fact that our model predicts that a single national demand shock should 
have differential effects on metropolitan areas depending on their superstar status. 
We report evidence confirming each of the implications just discussed.
For example, when the aggregate number of high-income households in the 
United States grows, house prices in superstar MSAs increase by more than in non-
superstar MSAs, and both the average and right tail of the income distributions in 
superstar cities increase relatively more than in nonsuperstar cities. We also allow 
for time-varying superstar status. When a metropolitan area transitions to being a 
superstar, we see an acceleration in house price growth and in the right-shift of 
the income distribution. And, in the cross section, superstar metropolitan areas or 
municipalities have higher house prices and a higher income population. Overall, 
the superstar mechanism explains a substantial portion of the increase in house price 
dispersion over the last 50 years.
We find that these empirical patterns also hold within a metropolitan area. That 
is, an increase in the high-income population in a metropolitan area yields increas-
ing price and income dispersion across municipalities within that area, with price 
growth, income growth, and income skewness in “superstar suburbs” outpacing 
those in nonsuperstar localities.
We also document that house prices in superstar MSAs and municipalities 
(within an MSA) are a higher multiple of current rents. When aggregate hous-
ing demand increases, those multiples expand more for superstar MSAs than for 
nonsuperstars.
This superstar cities mechanism is an important addition to the standard the-
ories of urban housing demand growth, which include productivity shocks or 
growth in agglomerations. Such theories typically depend on local shocks to 
housing demand, and it would be unusual for those shocks to match the propa-
gation from higher to lower geographies that we find. In addition, to the extent 
that productivity growth within a labor market area is more uniform than across 
metropolitan areas, productivity growth-based theories are less consistent with 
the house price growth dispersion across communities within a metropolitan area 
that we observe. However, standard determinants of urban housing demand are 
likely to be what differentiates locations in the cross section, and our empiri-
cal evidence does not preclude them from being additional components of urban 
housing demand growth.
Finally, we emphasize that our superstar mechanism is intended to explain differ-
ences in long-run trend growth rates of house prices, not short-run boom/bust cycles. 
By definition, superstar MSAs have higher long-run trend house price growth rates 
than others, but that does not mean their house prices increase every year. Superstar 
MSAs can and do experience considerable short-run house price volatility, with 
prices that cycle around strongly positive appreciation trends.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I outlines a simple two-location 
model that shows how heterogeneity in location preferences, and supply elas-
ticity combined with growing aggregate demand, can combine to generate the 
patterns in the data described above. Section II then discusses the data used in 
our analysis. Section III reports the results. Section IV provides a brief summary 
and conclusion.
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I. Superstar Cities: A Simple Model
In this section, we derive five implications of the superstar cities mechanism that 
we will then take to the data. In doing so, we sketch the underlying framework and 
provide intuition, leaving formal proofs to the Appendix.
To focus on the economic forces central to our hypothesis, we simplify the model 
to a few key elements. One is that we consider only two locations.5 They differ in 
their elasticity of land supply. Location A, the always-Available location, has per-
fectly elastic supply and housing is always available at a normalized rent of zero. 
Location B has Barriers to development, and thus has a capacity of K(r) households. 
That capacity can be increased if rents, r, are high enough to make new construction 
worthwhile, so  K′ (r) ≥ 0, with B having perfectly inelastic supply if this holds as 
an equality. 6 The new capacity could be in location B, or in new locations that are 
perfect substitutes for B. Thus,  K′ (r)is finite when newly developed locations are not 
perfect substitutes for B or are not perfectly elastically supplied.
There are n households in the economy, and each has a constant preference for A 
or B, denoted by  c i ~ H(·) on [0, 1]. A higher  c i corresponds to a greater taste for B. 
It is not necessary that one location is universally “better” than the other, only that 
enough households prefer B (for whatever reason) at zero rent to fully occupy it.7
Households also vary by their inherent productivity, with type  w i ~ F(·) on 
[0, ∞), and are paid a productivity wage. We also allow for the possibility that A 
and B are differently productive in the sense that the same worker would be more 
productive in one city than the other. A worker of type  w i produces  w i if she works 
in A, but β  w i + α if she works in B, where β ≥ 0. This exogenous difference in 
location productivity could be due to a variety of factors ranging from a production 
agglomeration to simple natural advantage. Obviously, the special case of α = 0 and 
β = 1 reduces to all households being equally productive in either city. We assume 
that  w i ⊥  c i , so that households of all abilities have the same distribution of prefer-
ences over the two cities.
The utility for household i is denoted by  v i and is a function of being in the 
preferred location and of nonhousing consumption. Household utility in A is given 
by  v i A = (1 −  c i ) w i , and in B, by  v i B =  c i (β  w i + α − r). Thus, if  c i = 1, the house-
hold would prefer location B to the exclusion of all else. We will make the com-
mon simplifying assumption that there are no costs of moving, so the household 
chooses whichever location gives it the most utility:  v i = max( v i A ,  v i B ). This frame-
work further assumes that the marginal rate of substitution between housing and 
nonhousing consumption is zero and that housing can be consumed only in a fixed 
quantity. These serve to emphasize the households’ choice of location and are com-
mon assumptions (e.g., Sinai and Souleles 2005).
5 These locations could be metropolitan areas or towns within a given area. If the former, the aggregate growth 
discussed below pertains to the nation; if the latter, it reflects that of the relevant metropolitan area.
6 Epple and Platt (1998) present a more formal and extensive treatment of a similar model with multiple loca-
tions, but assume that land supply is perfectly inelastic in all jurisdictions. By limiting the model to two locations 
and allowing for elastic supply, we emphasize the testable empirical implications of differences in the elasticity 
of supply.
7 The taste parameter is intended to reflect heterogeneity in household preferences for local traits. Examples 
include the type of amenities, weather, consumption possibilities, and location.
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In choosing to live in the location where their utilities are highest, households 
trade off rental costs, their preferences for that location, their incomes, and any pro-
ductivity difference. We focus on the case where latent demand to live in B exceeds 
the space that would be available if rent were zero. If B was not fully occupied, it 
would be free and households would sort between the locations based only on their 
tastes and any productivity differences.
Virtually all of the important implications of the superstar mechanism follow 
from the first lemma which deals with how sorting across locations occurs.
LEMMA 1: conditional on an agent’s taste,  c i , and the productivity differences 
between the two locations, the agent chooses to live in B if her wage,  w i , is greater 
than a cutoff value  w _( c i ).
A utility maximizing agent prefers B to A when  v i B ≥  v i A :
(1)   c i (β w i + α − r) ≥ (1 −  c i ) w i .
Solving this expression in terms of  w i , the cutoff as a function of the agent’s wage 
is given by the following expression:
(2)   w _( c i ) ≡  
(r − α) c i 
  __  
(1 + β) c i − 1
 .
This cutoff is binding only if  w _( c i ) ≥  r − α _β  , since for  w i <  
r − α _β  the agent obtains 
negative utility from living in B and would always choose to live in A instead, where 
she is guaranteed nonnegative utility. Moreover, unless r ≥ α, the cutoff trivially 
binds given  w i ∈ [0, ∞).
Two relevant corollaries are as follows.
COROLLARY 1: conditional on her wage,  w i , an agent with taste greater than a 
cutoff value  c _( w i ) chooses location B.
Inverting (2), the cutoff value is given by
(3)   c _( w i ) =  
 w i  __ 
(1 + β) w i + α − r
 .
Since the wages for agents living in B are constrained to  w i ∈ [  r − α _β  , ∞), the 
taste threshold is bounded in the following way:  1 _ 
1 + β ≤  c _( w i ) ≤ 1.
COROLLARY 2: if r > α, both the wage cutoff  w _( c i ) and the taste cutoff  c _( w i ) are 
decreasing in their arguments  c i and  w i , respectively, and increasing in the rental 
price r.
This can be shown by taking the derivatives of the cutoffs with respect to their 
arguments.
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(4)  
d w _( c i ) 
d c i 
  =  
−(r − α)
  __  
[(1 + β) c i − 1 ] 2 
 < 0
(5)  
d c _( w i ) 
d w i 
  =  
−(r − α)
  __ 
[(1 + β) w i + α − r  ] 2 
 < 0.
Due to the trade-off in utility between nonhousing consumption and location, 
agents with higher tastes for B will sort into B at a lower wage threshold. Due to 
the curvature of wages in the utility function, agents with higher wages will sort 
into B for lower levels of intrinsic taste for the location. Corollary 1 showed that 
r ≥ α is a necessary condition for the wage cutoff to bind. That, plus the results in 
Lemma 1, and Corollary 1, make it evident that both  w _( c i ) and  c _( w i ) are increasing 
in the rent, r.
From these basic results flow the implications of the propositions outlined next.
PROPOSITION 1: rent and the average wage are higher in B than in A.
Rent is higher in B than A as long as  K′ (r) < ∞ since rent is zero in A and greater 
than zero in B due to the assumption of excess demand for B.8 The difference in rent 
between B and A increases with the inelasticity of supply in B or of close substitutes 
to B. Since only households with wages in excess of their cutoffs  w _( c i ) are willing 
to pay the rent premium to live in B, and tastes are independent of wages, the wage 
distribution in B is shifted to the right relative to A.
Figure 3 provides the intuition behind this result. It plots  w _( c i ) as a solid line in 
( c i ,  w i )space. Households with ( c i ,  w i )to the southwest of  w _( c i ) will choose to live 
in A and those to the northeast will pick B. The households in A include those that 
would prefer A even if B was free ( c i < 0.5), and those that would prefer B if rent 
were lower but will choose A at the clearing rent.9
PROPOSITION 2: The share of households that are high income is higher in B than 
in A.
The intuition follows directly from Proposition 1 and Figure 3. Low-wage house-
holds are more likely than high-wage households to defect from B if living there 
8 This rent premium is due to the interaction of the underlying scarcity of land with heterogenous tastes for 
location rather than the cost of housing structures, which is similar across markets. This is consistent with the 
literature, which shows that house price differences across markets are greater than construction cost differences 
(e.g., Gyourko and Saiz 2006).
9 Figure 3 assumes the wage distribution is lognormal (0, 1),  c i is distributed uniform [0, 1], α = 0, and β = 1. 
The proofs in the Appendix show that our results hold for any distribution of wages or tastes, as long as they are 
independent, and for any productivity differences. Because the B region always occupies the upper right-hand 
section of Figure 3, as long as the wage distribution is constant across the taste dimension, relatively high-income 
households always will disproportionately live in B. However, if the taste distribution is evolving, it is not neces-
sarily distinct from the income distribution drivers that we consider below in our empirical work. In that sec-
tion, we report evidence that changes in the income distribution generate a large fraction of the empirical patterns 
we observe, but that does not preclude changing tastes from being an additional factor. However, we consider it 
unlikely that changing tastes would be spuriously correlated with the effect of the income distribution so as to 
confound our estimates.
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requires paying rent. That implies that the households remaining in B are dispropor-
tionately high-income. As Figure 3 illustrates, households in the region choosing B 
must be weighted toward the high end of the wage distribution.
PROPOSITION 3: Aggregate population growth causes rent growth in B and the 
effect is increasing in the inelasticity of housing supply.
COROLLARY 3.1: Aggregate population growth results in an increase in the aver-
age wage of agents choosing to live in B.
As the population grows, the absolute number of households that prefer to live in 
B will increase because the fraction that prefers B is unchanged. Some of the new 
households have a higher willingness to pay for B than some of the old households 
and, since supply in B is not perfectly elastic, rents increase to clear the market. The 
less elastic is the supply of B, or of locations that are close substitutes to B, the less 
location B can accommodate the increased demand, and the more rents must rise. 
A higher rent requires that a household have a higher wage to be indifferent between 
A and B, so the average wage of the households that are still willing to live in B 
is higher.
Supply inelasticity plays an important role in determining the magnitude of the 
differences between A and B. The proofs in the Appendix show that when supply 
is nearly perfectly elastic the differences between A and B are infinitesimal, and 
Figure 3. Sorting between Locations A and B as Population Increases and  
the Wage Distribution Shifts
notes: α = 0; β = 1. Tastes are distributed uniform (0, 1).  K′ (r) = 0 and capacity in B is 0.33n. 
Rent is computed in equilibrium based on equation (12) in the Appendix. For  w _( c i ) and  w _( c i )′, 
wages are distributed lognormal (0, 1).  w _( c i )′ corresponds to the case when n doubles and 
capacity in B is unchanged.  w _( c i )″ corresponds to the case when n has doubled and wages are 
distributed lognormal (0.7, 0.9).
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as it becomes harder to bring new supply to market the magnitude of the superstar 
effect increases. Thus, in practice, supply in B would have to be noticeably inelastic 
for there to be sizeable differences between A and B in rent growth and conse-
quently their income distributions. Similarly, since we can think of substitute cities 
for B as akin to additional supply of B, only if perfect substitutes for B are in com-
pletely elastic supply would we expect to see no superstar mechanism whatsoever. 
However, large differences between B and A would arise only if replicating a city is 
difficult or there are barriers to construction in substitute cities.
The case of perfectly inelastic supply of B is depicted in Figure  3 where the 
wage cutoff function  w _( c i )′, plotted with a dashed line, corresponds to a doubling 
of the population relative to  w _( c i ) and an unchanged capacity of B and distribution 
of wages. Rent nearly triples, from 62 to 164, to clear the market. A smaller share 
of the population now chooses B, and the households that do so on average have a 
higher taste for B and more income.
PROPOSITION 4: A more skewed aggregate wage distribution with a thicker right 
tail leads to higher wages and rents in B.
If the wage distribution shifts to the right, more households will have wages in 
excess of  w _( c i )and would choose B. This increase in demand for B will be met with 
higher rent in B as long as new construction in B is not perfectly elastic. A rise in 
rent increases  w _( c i ) at every  c i , but more so for low-wage households than for high-
wage households. The higher indifference wage crowds out relatively low-wage and 
low-taste-for-B households who will instead live in A. The remaining households in 
B will be even more relatively high-wage than before, increasing the average wage 
of residents of B. To the extent that B does not have perfectly inelastic supply, new 
construction will accommodate some of the new demand, but not enough to fully 
undo the increase in wages and rent.
The dotted line in Figure 3 shows what would happen in our example if the wage 
distribution shifted and the population doubled without a commensurate increase in 
the capacity of B. The clearing rent rises to 277, and most lower wage households 
are crowded out of B by the new high-wage, high-taste households.
PROPOSITION 5: An anticipated growth in aggregate population or the number 
of high-income individuals in the aggregate population results in a higher price-to-
rent ratio in B than in A.
We follow the tradition in the housing literature in presuming that in asset market 
equilibrium, house price in city m, which we denote  P 0 m , equals the expected present 
value of future rents  r t, m plus a risk adjustment or
(6)   P 0 m =  ∫ 0 
∞
  r t, m e −δt dt +  π m ,
where δ is the discount rate and  π m is the MSA-constant risk premium (e.g., Meese 
and Wallace 1994, Sinai and Souleles 2005, and Ortalo-Magné and Prat 2011). 
voL. 5 no. 4 177Gyourko Et al.: SupErStar CitiES
If rents grow at a constant rate so that  r t, m =  r 0, m  e  g m t , we obtain the continuous-time 
Gordon Growth Model with an additional adjustment for risk:
(7)   
 P 0, m 
 _ r 0, m   =  ∫ 0 
∞
  e −(δ− g m t) dt +  π m =  
1 _ 
δ −  g m 
 +  π m .
From equation (7), it follows that the price-to-income ratio is increasing in the 
growth rate:
(8)   d _ 
d g m 
  (  P 0, m  _ r 0, m   ) =  1 _ (δ −  g m ) 2  > 0.
By the chain rule of differentiation,
(9)   g m =  
d r m  _
dt
  =  
d r m  _
dn
   dn _
dt
  .
In Proposition 3, we showed that  d r m  _dn  is higher for location B, hence the growth 
rate of rent in B is higher than in A. Aggregate population growth,  dn _dt  , enters iden-
tically into equation (9) for locations B and A, so  g B >  g A . Since the price-to-rent 
ratio is increasing in the rental growth rate, there is a higher price-to-rent ratio in B 
than in A. The second part of this proposition follows similar logic. If agents antici-
pate a right-ward shift in the wage distribution, then this leads to higher future rents 
per Proposition 3. Higher future rents precipitate a higher growth rate of rents by 
definition. It then follows from the previous results that a higher growth rate in rents 
leads to a higher price-to-rent ratio in B than in A.
II. Data Description
Our primary data source is the six decennial United States censuses taken between 
1950 and 2000. We obtained information on the distributions of house values, rents, 
family incomes, population, and the number of housing units at two levels of geo-
graphical aggregation: metropolitan areas, and census-designated places, which are 
municipalities such as cities and towns. All dollar values are converted into constant 
2000 dollars using the CPI-U price index.
The MSA data used in our empirical analysis consists of a panel of 279 areas 
that had populations of at least 50,000 in 1950 and are in the continental United 
States.10 Our metro area definition is based on 1990 county boundaries to project 
10 Thirty-six areas with populations under 50,000 in 1950 were excluded from our analysis because of concerns 
about abnormal house quality changes in markets with so few units at the start of our period of analysis. None of our 
key results are materially affected by this paring of the sample. Similar concerns account for our not using data from 
the first Census of Housing in 1940. (All individual housing trait data from the 1940 census were lost, so we cannot 
track any trait changes over time from that year.) We did repeat our MSA-level analysis over the 1940–2000 time 
period. While the point estimates naturally differ from those reported below, the magnitudes, signs, and statistical 
significance are essentially unchanged. Finally, the New York PMSA is excluded from the analysis reported below 
because it is missing house price data for 1960.
178 AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: EconoMic PoLicy novEMBEr 2013
consistent metro area boundaries forward and backward through time.11 Data were 
collected at the county level and aggregated to the metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) or primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA) level in the case of consoli-
dated metropolitan statistical areas.12 Data for the 1970–2000 period were obtained 
from GeoLytics, which compiles long-form data from the decennial censuses of 
Housing and Population. We hand-collected data spanning 1950 and 1960 from 
hard copy volumes of the census of Population and Housing. Both sources are 
based on 100 percent population counts. At the census place level, we extracted data 
for 1970–2000 from the GeoLytics CD-ROMs.13
The primary strength of using house price data from the decennial censuses is 
that it is available on a consistent basis over the half-century-long period needed for 
our analysis. The weakness is that the underlying observations are both self-reported 
and not quality adjusted. However, correlations between constant quality and unad-
justed house price series are high over decadal-length periods. For example, the cor-
relation across house price appreciation rates for a large set of consistently defined 
MSAs in our census data and the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA) 
constant quality house price index is 0.94 in the 1980s and 0.87 in the 1990s.
Income also is central to our analysis. To categorize the distribution of income, 
we divide real family incomes into five categories that are consistent over time. 
The income categories in the original census data change in each decade, so we 
set the category boundaries equal to 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent of the 1960 family 
income top code, and then populate the resulting five bins using a weighted aver-
age of the actual categories in real (year 2000) dollars (assuming a uniform dis-
tribution of families within the bins). Since 1960 had amongst the lowest top code 
in real terms, using it as an upper bound reduces miscategorization of families 
into income bins. This results in the following bins. We call a family “poor” if its 
income is less than $36,384 in real (year 2000) dollars. “Middle poor” are those 
families with incomes between $36,384 and $72,769, “middle” income families 
have incomes between $72,769 and $109,153, “middle-rich” families lie between 
$109,153 and $145,537, and “rich” families have incomes in excess of the 1960 
real topcode of $145,537. It is important to recognize that the quartiles of the 1960 
income top code do not correspond to quartiles of the income distribution; there 
are far more families in the “poor” category than in the “rich” category. Thus, 
our choice of income bin boundaries provides more detail in the right tail of the 
income distribution.
11 We use definitions provided by the Office of Management and Budget, available at http://www.census.gov/
population/estimates/metro-city/90mfips.txt.
12 All our conclusions are robust to aggregating to the CMSA level.
13 While states differ in the extent to which local jurisdictions control new construction, or even whether they 
can change their boundaries, census-designated places provide a useful comparable sample. The 1970 data include 
only 6,963 out of 20,768 places. (Conversations with the Census Bureau suggest that the micro data on the remain-
ing places has been lost or is not readily available.) Fortunately, these places account for more than 95 percent of 
US population in 1970. In 2000, 161 million people lived in these 6,963 places, 206 million people in all places, and 
281 million people in the entire United States. We further limit the sample to places within a MSA.
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III. Empirical Evidence
The underlying conditions necessary for the superstar cities hypothesis to be true 
have been present in the post-World War II era. Between 1950 and 2000, the number 
of families in US metropolitan areas doubled, with the number making more than 
$140,000 in constant (year 2000) dollars increasing more than eight-fold according 
to the US Census Bureau. And, some metropolitan areas and local communities 
have more inelastic housing supply than others, either because of local regulation 
or geographic restrictions (e.g., Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers and 2008; Saiz 2010; 
Paciorek forthcoming). Given that, we now take the model to the data and test the 
five Propositions from Section I.
A. Defining Superstar Markets
Our first step is to define empirical proxies for the theoretical characteristics of 
superstar markets: preference for the location and inelastic supply. We use the fact that 
demand growth has to be manifested either in price growth or housing unit growth to 
construct these variables. We measure growth in mean real prices and housing units at 
the MSA level over 20-year periods. This window size gives us growth rates defined 
over four time periods: 1950 –1970, 1960 –1980, 1970 –1990, and 1980 –2000. We 
identify high-demand MSAs by applying a simple cutoff of whether the sum of the 
price and quantity growth rates for the market is above the sample median. This 
definition captures the idea that both inelastically supplied markets with very lim-
ited new construction but high price appreciation and elastic markets with minimal 
price growth but lots of construction should be categorized as in high demand. We 
allow the high-demand cutoff to vary over time in order to account for changes in 
the aggregate economy. For example, an MSA is defined as being in high demand in 
1970 if the sum of its price and housing unit growth rates from 1950 –1970 exceeds 
the sample median for that period. We proxy for the inverse supply elasticity with the 
ratio of the price growth rate to the housing unit growth rate. In a city with inelas-
tic supply, demand growth is manifested more in price growth than in housing unit 
growth, so this ratio should be high.
We define an indicator variable for superstar status (Superstar) based on whether 
a MSA is in the “high demand” category and in the top decile of the ratio of price 
growth rate-to-housing unit growth rate based on growth rates over the prior 
two decades.14 Due to the two-decade lag for computing growth rates, 1970 is the 
first  year for which we can define a superstar. The sample of superstars, broken 
down by decade in Appendix Table A3, includes major metropolitan areas that are 
superstars in multiple years as well as smaller MSAs that enter and exit superstar 
status. To purge those noisy MSAs from our sample, we define the MSA-constant 
14 As shown in Section I, there can be different degrees of “superstarness,” so if a location is more preferred rela-
tive to its capacity and/or has less elastic housing supply, it will exhibit more pronounced superstar characteristics. 
In our empirical analysis, we refer to only the most prominent examples as “superstars” since that lines up well with 
the empirical distribution, which has a skewed right tail, and makes the exposition more concise. However, all our 
key conclusions are robust to estimation with a continuous measure, defined as the ratio of the price growth rate to 
the housing unit growth rate for high-demand MSAs or places.
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Superstar i as one if the time-varying  Superstar it equals one in any two  decades 
between 1970 and 2000, and redefine  Superstar it to equal one only for MSAs that 
are superstars for at least two decades. However, we obtain very similar results when 
we define  Superstar i as those MSAs that are in the superstar category for one or 
more census years.
To illustrate where MSAs fall along the dimensions that make up a superstar city, 
Figures 4 and 5 plot average real annual house price growth against housing unit 
growth during the 1960 –1980 and 1980 –2000 periods, respectively. Three regions 
are outlined in each figure. Region C, below the negatively sloped dashed line, cor-
responds to low demand as defined above (i.e., they have sums of price and hous-
ing unit growth rates below the sample median for the corresponding time period). 
Among the high-demand MSAs, regions B and A are, respectively, above and below 
the ninetieth percentile price growth rate to quantity growth rate threshold (about 
1.7) that we use for our binary definition of a superstar city. Thus, the markets in 
Region B are superstars because they are both in the high-growth region and in the 
top decile of inelasticity of supply. By contrast, MSAs in the A range also have high 
demand, but they have more elastic supply since they are closer to the x-axis and have 
built more new units relative to the real house price appreciation they experienced.
Beyond providing snapshots of superstar status at two  points in time, these 
two figures also illustrate some of the time series variation that we will exploit in 
our regression analysis. In the face of geographic constraints or politically imposed 
restrictions on development, it seems natural that at least some high-demand met-
ropolitan areas would become more inelastically supplied over time as demand for 
their scarce housing units becomes larger and they begin to “fill up.” This process 
would appear as a market moving counter-clockwise around the origin over time. 
We do observe such evolutions. For example, Figure 4 shows that by 1980, San 
Francisco and Los Angeles qualified as superstars. In 1970 (which is based on data 
from 1950 –1970), both markets were in the A range of the plot. Figure 5 then shows 
that by the end of our sample period in 2000, 20 more high-demand MSAs filled up, 
also becoming superstars.
At the census place level, we categorize a place as a superstar if it is both high 
demand and in the top quartile of the ratio of price growth to unit growth. The meth-
odology for determining which communities are “high demand” and for comput-
ing their supply elasticities is comparable to our MSA-level procedure.15 However, 
the place data are available only from 1970 to 2000 so, after accounting for the 
two decades of lags required to compute these variables, our useable place-level 
sample covers only 1990 and 2000.
15 A place is considered to be high demand if its sum of price and housing unit growth rates exceeds that period’s 
median across all places in all MSAs. The 75th percentile ratio of price growth rate to unit growth rate for places 
(2.0) is close to the ninetieth percentile for MSAs (1.7) because the distribution for places has thicker tails than 
for MSAs.
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B. Results
Propositions 1 and 2: Do Superstar Cities or Suburbs Have Different Prices or 
Incomes?—Propositions 1 and 2 state that superstar MSAs or towns should have 
higher house prices and higher average incomes. In addition, the income distributions 
should be shifted more to the right—superstars should have relatively larger shares 
of their populations in the high-income bins and smaller shares in the low-income 
bins. We will first see if these predictions hold in the cross section for MSAs, then 
for census places, and then within MSAs as they change superstar status. Appendix 
Tables A1 and A2 report summary statistics for all variables used in this section.
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Figure 4. Real Annual House Price Growth versus Unit Growth, 1960 –1980
Figure 5. Real Annual House Price Growth versus Unit Growth, 1980 –2000
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We estimate the following bivariate regression using our panel of 279 MSAs over 
four, two-decade periods (for a total of 1,116 MSA × year observations):
  y it =  β 1  Superstar i +  δ t +  ε it 
for MSA i in year t.16 The dependent variable,  y it , takes a variety of outcomes, 
including the log house value, log income, and the share of families in each of 
the income categories. Year dummies also are included. Thus, the estimated coef-
ficient  β 1 measures the average difference between MSAs that ever are superstars 
and other MSAs.
The results are reported in panel A of Table 2. Superstar status is associated with 
higher average and tenth percentile house values, higher average income, a greater 
share of the MSA’s residents in the high-income categories, and a lower share in 
the low-income categories. Moreover, the point estimates are economically large as 
well as statistically significant. For example, in the first column, where the depen-
dent variable is the log of the MSA’s average house value, the estimated coefficient 
16 To be faithful to the model in Section I, we compare the outcomes for superstar cities to all other metropolitan 
areas. In the model, cities with less demand than capacity are perfectly elastically supplied, whereas cities with 
excess demand can have varying supply elasticities. We compare the high-demand, inelastic cities to both low-
demand cities and high-demand, elastic cities. In practice, not all low-demand cities appear to have elastic supply 
by our measures. This may be due to measurement error, or house prices being below construction cost as in Glaeser 
and Gyourko (2005). However, we have obtained comparable results even when including a separate control for 
low-demand areas.
Table 2—MSA and Place-Level Differences in Superstar MSAs
Left-hand-side variable
log
house 
value
log tenth 
percentile 
house value
log 
mean 
income
Share of families in the ____ category
Rich Middle rich Middle Middle poor Poor
Panel A. Pooled MSA cross sections, year fixed effects
 Superstar i 
 [Relative to the mean of the 
  LHS variable]
0.6053
(0.0729)
0.7844
(0.0855)
0.2360
(0.0308)
0.0339
(0.0058)
[1.017]
0.0284
(0.0039)
[0.804]
0.0524
(0.0066)
[0.405]
− 0.0094
(0.0061)
[− 0.023]
− 0.1053
(0.0137)
[− 0.262]
Adjusted r 2 0.4162 0.3149 0.4605 0.4151 0.5952 0.3584 0.1177 0.1969
Mean of LHS 11.54 10.64 10.84 0.033 0.035 0.129 0.400 0.402
Panel B. Pooled Place cross sections, MSA × year fixed effects
 Superstar k 
 [Relative to the mean of the 
  LHS variable]
0.3668
(0.0225)
0.2723
(0.0163)
0.2448
(0.0118)
0.0759
(0.0032)
[1.231]
0.0167
(0.0015)
[0.257]
-0.0006
(0.0022)
[-0.004]
− 0.0427
(0.0028)
[− 0.114]
− 0.0493
(0.0047)
[− 0.148]
Adjusted r 2 0.4766 0.6804 0.3795 0.2535 0.4258 0.4040 0.2779 0.4381
Mean of LHS 11.72 11.16 11.01 0.062 0.065 0.166 0.375 0.332
Panel c. MSA panel, MSA and year fixed effects
 Superstar it 
 [Relative to the mean of the 
  LHS variable]
0.4427
(0.0304)
0.2744
(0.0511)
0.1224
(0.0127)
0.0325
(0.0021)
[0.977]
0.0316
(0.0020)
[0.895]
0.0082
(0.0032)
[0.063]
− 0.0543
(0.0062)
[− 0.136]
− 0.0180
(0.0081)
[− 0.045]
Adjusted r 2 0.8679 0.8311 0.9121 0.8203 0.8683 0.8948 0.7046 0.8584
notes: In panels A and C, the number of observations is 1,116 for four decades (1970 –2000) and 279 MSAs. In panel B, the sample 
period is 1990 –2000 and covers 3,788 census places over two decades (n = 7,576). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered by MSA in panel A. The specification in panels A and B is  y it =  β 1 Supersta r i +  δ t +  ε it , where the superstar 
variable is not time-varying and is defined at the MSA level in panel A and the place level in panel B. In panel C, the specification is 
y it =  β 1 Supersta r it +  δ t +  γ i +  ε it , where the superstar variable is defined at the MSA level and varies over time. The means of the 
left-hand-side variables in panel C are the same as in panel A.
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of 0.6053 for log house value (0.0729 standard error) implies that superstar MSAs 
have 60 percent higher average house values. The second column uses the log of 
the MSA’s tenth percentile house value as the dependent variable in an attempt to 
more closely reflect the changing minimum entry price for an MSA due to rising 
land values, as well as better control for differences in spending on the structure 
component of housing. The estimated coefficient is even larger, 0.7844 (0.0855 
standard error).17
In the cross section, superstar MSAs also have income distributions that are 
shifted to the right relative to other MSAs. In column 3, average incomes are shown 
to be nearly 24 percent higher (standard error of about 3 percent) in superstars. We 
look at other points in the income distribution in columns 4 through 8. The outcome 
variables in these columns correspond to each of the five income bins (y) in each 
MSA i in year t:  y it =  
# in income  bin yit 
  __# of  households yit  . For example, in column 4, we find that the 
mean share of households in the “rich” group in superstar MSAs is 3.4 percentage 
points higher than in other MSAs. Since the income distribution outcome variables 
in columns 4 through 8 are not in logs, in those columns we report the estimated 
elasticity (in square brackets) in addition to the usual point estimate. For example, 
since the share of the income distribution that is in the “rich” category averages just 
3.3 percent, the estimated effect of 0.0339 amounts to a 101.7 percent increase in 
the “rich” share relative to the average. In addition, we find that superstars have an 
80 percent higher share middle-rich, 41 percent higher share middle-income, and 
26 percent lower “poor” households.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the analogous results using Place-level data. In this 
case, our research design can control nonparametrically for any confounding unob-
servable factor that might vary by MSAs or across MSAs over time, using only 
variation across towns within an MSA in a given year to identify our estimates.18 
The place-level version of our regression is
  y kit =  β 1  superstar k +  δ it +  ε kit .
The unit of observation is now census place k in MSA i in year t. Superstar status 
is determined at the place level. MSA × year fixed effects also are included.
The Place-level results in panel B of Table 2 exhibit very similar patterns to those 
found across MSAs. Superstar towns in an MSA have higher house values and aver-
age incomes than other towns in the same MSA and year. They also have income 
distributions that are shifted to the right. In particular, we find that average house 
values in superstar towns are 37 percent higher (column 1 of Table 2) and incomes 
are 24 percent higher (column 3 of Table 2). The share of the population in the top 
17 While our empirical results, in keeping with the prior literature, focus on house values, the model in Section I 
is expressed in terms of rents. We have obtained comparable results throughout this paper when using log average 
rent as the dependent variable.
18 For example, to the extent that productivity growth is more constant within MSAs than between them, our 
Place-level estimates, by controlling nonparametrically for MSA × year unobservables, will better control for 
it. However, Moretti’s (2011) and Baum-Snow and Pavan’s (forthcoming) evidence that households sort among 
cities differentially based on growth in the returns to skill underscore how difficult it is to completely reject 
productivity-based explanations.
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two income categories is substantially greater, and the fraction of the population in 
the bottom two income categories experiences an offsetting decline.
Another approach to controlling for unobservable MSA-level characteristics is 
to see what happens when an MSA becomes a superstar. By using the time-varying 
definition of superstar, we can include MSA-level fixed effects, thus controlling for 
unobserved differences across MSAs that could confound the relationship between 
demand, supply elasticity, and the outcome variables. Instead, the identification 
strategy measures how much the outcome variables change when the MSA is a 
superstar versus when it is not. In the bottom panel of Table 2, we report estimates 
from the following regression equation:
  y it =  β 1  Superstar it +  δ t +  γ i +  ε it .
Relative to panel A, we have added a MSA fixed effect,  γ i , and allowed  Superstar it 
to vary over time, as defined in the Data section.
We find the same pattern in within-MSA differences over time that we observed 
across MSAs. MSAs experience increases in house prices and average incomes, and 
become more rich and less poor, when they are in the superstar region. The effect on 
house values and average income is smaller than in panel A, but still economically 
large and statistically significant. This pattern indicates that MSAs that become 
superstars had higher house prices and incomes than other MSAs prior to becoming 
superstars, and experienced an additional jump in house prices and average incomes 
after becoming superstars. The coefficients on the income bins are also smaller in 
panel C of Table 2 than in panel A, though the fundamental pattern and significance 
is maintained. The share of an MSA’s population in the top two  income catego-
ries increases by at least 90  percent when the MSA enters the superstar region, 
the middle-income category grows by about 6 percent, and the share in the bottom 
two income categories falls between 4 and 14 percent.
Propositions 3 and 4: Are Superstars Differently Affected When the Aggregate 
income Distribution changes?—At the national/MSA levels, the model implies 
that when either the US population or share of the population that is high income 
increases, land prices should rise fastest and the local income distributions should 
shift to the right the most in superstar MSAs. We do not try to distinguish between 
the effects of population and income share in our empirical analysis, instead com-
bining the two factors into one measure: the number of high-income families. We 
then look for empirical evidence at the national/MSA and then MSA/place levels.
The top panel of Table 3 reports results from our national/MSA regression speci-
fication that relates a time-varying MSA outcome to changes in the national income 
distribution and time-invariant differences across MSAs in their superstar status. 
Specifically, the regression equation takes the following form:
  y it =  β 1  Superstar t × ln(#  rich t ) +  γ i +  δ t +  ε it 
for MSA i in year t. The dependent variable,  y it , takes the usual set of outcomes.
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The first regressor interacts the time-invariant superstar indicator with the log 
of the number of households at the national level that are in the “rich” income bin 
(ln(# rich t )). The superstar indicator varies across MSAs and the number of rich 
households varies over time, so the interaction varies over time within an MSA. 
Thus, the estimated coefficient  β 1 measures how changes in the number of rich fami-
lies at the aggregate level differentially affect superstar cities relative to all other cit-
ies. The MSA fixed effects ( γ i ) control for MSA-level unobserved heterogeneity and 
the year dummies ( δ t ) absorb influences that vary only over time, such as aggregate 
macroeconomic factors. These fixed effects also subsume the uninteracted effects of 
supply elasticity or the aggregate number of rich families.19
The results support Propositions 3 and 4. In the first column of Table 3, where the 
dependent variable is the log of the MSA-average house value, the estimated coef-
ficient of 0.3943 (0.0356 standard error) indicates that house values rise by more 
in more inelastic, high-demand MSAs when the national number of rich families 
increases. We observe a smaller, though still statistically significant, effect on the 
tenth percentile house value.
To get a sense of the magnitudes, consider that between 1970 and 2000 the num-
ber of rich families in the United States grew by 160 percent. In the first column, 
the average house values in superstar MSAs are estimated to rise by 39 percent-
age points more than in other MSAs when the number of rich families nationally 
doubles. In actuality, mean house prices in superstar MSAs grew 75  percentage 
points more than in other MSAs, so the pressure of the growing national income 
19 We obtain similar results by taking first-differences within MSAs.
Table 3—How Changes in the Aggregate Number of Rich Households Differentially Affect 
Superstar MSAs and Places
Left-hand-side variable
log 
house 
value
log tenth 
percentile 
house value
log 
mean 
income
Share of families in the ____ category
Rich Middle rich Middle Middle poor Poor
Panel A. MSA panel, MSA and year fixed effects
 Superstar i × log(#  rich t )
 [Relative to the mean of the 
  LHS variable]
0.3943
(0.0356)
0.1992
(0.0578)
0.1292
(0.0143)
0.0407
(0.0022)
[1.222]
0.0310 
(0.0023)
[0.877]
− 0.0003 
(0.0036)
[− 0.002]
− 0.0624
(0.0069)
[− 0.156]
− 0.0090
(0.0091)
[− 0.022]
Adjusted r 2 0.8555 0.8277 0.9110 0.8336 0.8591 0.8940 0.7060 0.8577
Mean of LHS: 11.54 10.64 10.84 0.033 0.035 0.129 0.400 0.402
Panel B. Pooled Place cross sections, MSA × year and Place fixed effects
 Superstar i × log(#  rich kt )
 [Relative to the mean of the 
  LHS variable]
0.1565
(0.0126)
0.0972
(0.0226)
0.0857
(0.0114)
0.0292
(0.0031)
[0.473]
− 0.0009
(0.0023)
[− 0.014]
− 0.0116
(0.0040)
[− 0.070]
0.0016
(0.0056)
[0.004]
− 0.0182
(0.0056)
[− 0.055]
Adjusted r 2 0.8123 0.6439 0.5804 0.4447 0.3689 0.3644 0.3412 0.4056
Mean of LHS 11.72 11.16 11.01 0.062 0.065 0.166 0.375 0.332
notes: In panel A, the sample period is 1970 –2000 and covers 279 MSAs over four decades (n = 1,116). In panel B, the sample 
period is 1990 –2000 and covers 3,788 census places over two decades (n = 7,576). Standard errors are in parentheses. In panel A, 
the specification is  y it =  β 1  Superstar t × ln(#  rich t ) +  γ i +  δ t +  ε it , where an indicator variable for an MSA ever being a 
“superstar” during the entire 1970 –2000 period is interacted with the log national number of families in the “rich” category. In 
panel B, the specification is  y it =  β 1  Superstar k × ln(#  rich t ) +  γ it +  δ k +  ε ikt , where an indicator variable for a census place 
ever being a “superstar” during the 1990 –2000 period is interacted with the MSA’s log number of families in the “rich” category. In 
both panels, the uninteracted variables are subsumed by the fixed effects.
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 distribution can account for more than 80 percent of the excess growth in house 
prices in Superstar cities in that specification.20
The remaining columns of panel  A of Table  3 address the implications of 
Propositions  2 and 3 that the rise in house prices in superstar cities should also 
affect the distribution of local incomes. Column 3 uses the log of the mean income 
in the MSA as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient of 0.1292 (0.0143) 
in the first row implies that doubling of the number of rich families in the country is 
associated with an 12.9 percentage point higher growth rate in average income in a 
superstar MSA. This represents all of the actual difference in the growth in average 
income between superstar MSAs and other MSAs over the 1970 to 2000 period.
Columns 4 through 8 of Table 3 report the estimated effects of growth in the 
national number of rich families at the various points in an MSA’s income distribu-
tion. These results show that when the national number of rich families increases, 
the income distribution shifts to the right more in superstar MSAs. Relative to 
other MSAs, superstars experience a larger increase in their share of households 
that are in the highest-income categories and a bigger decline in their middle-low-
income households. For example, the estimated coefficient of 0.0407 (0.0022) in the 
first row of column 4 implies that a doubling of the number of rich families nation-
ally would increase the share of households in the “rich” category for superstar cit-
ies by 4 percentage points more than in other MSAs. A similar, but smaller, effect is 
found among the “middle-rich” households in column 5, and no effect is found for 
middle-income households.
At the other end of the income spectrum, a doubling of the number of national 
rich families would yield more than a 6 percentage point excess decline in the share 
of households in the “middle-poor” category, consistent with the higher income 
households crowding out the lower income ones. We discern little differential 
change between superstar MSAs and other MSAs in the share of households in the 
“poor” category.21
These results also help distinguish the superstar cities mechanism from other 
potential sources of local housing demand. It seems unlikely that local growth (for 
example, changes in the α or β parameters from the model in Section  I) would 
match the geographic pattern, timing, and linkage to the national income distribu-
tion of MSA price growth that is predicted by our framework. In addition, potential 
confounding effects due to defining superstar cities based in part on average house 
price growth over the entire sample period are mitigated by directly controlling for 
the superstar nature of an MSA, thereby identifying the effect from the interaction 
of those variables with changes in the national income distribution.
The “superstar suburbs” logic implies that the number of rich families at the MSA 
level should be positively correlated with house price growth, income growth, and 
20 160 × 0.3943 = 63.1, which is 84.1 percent of 75.
21 Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2008) provide one possible explanation for the stickiness of low-income house-
holds—namely, that those who bought more cheaply in previous years simply remain in their homes. In effect, 
their wealth (due to homeownership) rises to offset rising house prices. Lee (2010) and Eeckhout, Pinheiro, 
and Schmidheiny (2010) provide other potential explanations based on the complementarity of low- and 
high-wage workers.
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the rich share of families at the census place level. The place-level version of our 
regression is
  y kit =  β 1  superstar k × ln(#  rich it ) +  γ k +  δ it +  ε kit .
The unit of observation is now census place k in MSA i in year t. Superstar status 
is determined at the place level, and  Superstar k is set equal to one if the census place 
is in the superstar region in either 1990 or 2000. The aggregate growth in the number 
rich is measured at the MSA × year level. Place and MSA × year fixed effects also 
are included.
The results reported in the bottom panel of Table 3 reveal a similar pattern to 
the MSA results in the top panel. The magnitudes on the estimated coefficients are 
attenuated, but remain statistically significant. In sum, there is substantial evidence 
among towns within a given metropolitan area that aggregate, MSA-level changes 
have disproportionate impacts on prices, wages, and the share rich in superstar com-
munities that have inelastic supplies and are in strong demand.22
Proposition 5: Price-to-rent ratios in Superstar Markets—Proposition 5 stated 
that prices would be a greater multiple of rents in superstar markets if growth in rents 
was anticipated. The first column of Table 4 uses the cross sectional,  MSA-level spec-
ification from panel A of Table 2, but with the log of the MSA-average  price-to-rent 
ratio as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient of 0.3145 from the first row 
indicates that, on average, prices are a 31 percent larger multiple of rents in superstar 
MSAs. Column 2 repeats the cross-section analysis at the  census place level, with 
22 One drawback of this level of geography is that our place-level data date only to 1970, which makes it more 
difficult to assess within-town changes over time. Because (ΔP/ΔQ ) ki requires two lagged decades to construct, 
we observe only one change per census place—between 1990 and 2000. Essentially, we are estimating whether the 
change in the left hand side variable between 1990 and 2000 is related to the growth in the number of rich families 
in the “parent” MSA over that time period. Because each of the 279 “parent” MSAs experienced different rates of 
growth in the number of rich families between 1990 and 2000, we have plenty of variation to identify the effects 
on the census places within those MSAs. We also have applied the measure of superstar status defined over the 
1990 –2000 period to the entire 1970 to 2000 sample, with consistent results.
Table 4—Price-to-Rent Ratio Results
Table # 2A 2B 2C 3A 3B
Variation Pooled cross 
section
Pooled cross 
section
Within-MSA 
changes
National
# Rich
MSA
# Rich
Geography MSA Place MSA MSA Place
 Superstar i 0.3145
(0.0437)
0.2661
(0.0196)
 Superstar it 0.2717
(0.0216)
 Superstar k × log(#  rich it ) 0.2222
(0.0253)
0.1229
(0.0143)
Fixed effects Year MSA × year MSA, year MSA, year MSA × year, place
Adjusted r 2 0.4030 0.2867 0.7936 0.7754 0.6639
n 1,116 7,576 1,116 1,116 7,576
note: The left-hand-side variable is the log average price/rent ratio.
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MSA × year fixed effects. We find that superstar suburbs have a 26  percent higher 
price-to-rent ratio than other towns. This pattern persists when MSAs transition to 
superstar status (column 3). In the years that MSAs are superstars, their price-to-rent 
ratios are 27 percent greater than in the years when they are not superstars. The last 
two columns of Table 4 relate changes in the price-to-rent ratio at the MSA or Place 
levels to changes in the number of “rich” households at an aggregate geography. In 
both cases, when the number of “rich” households increases, the price-to-rent ratio 
goes up by more in superstar MSAs or Places.
It is worth underscoring that this result is consistent with standard asset market 
equilibrium. Homeowners in superstar markets do not necessarily obtain a higher 
return; instead, they receive a higher expected capital gain at the expense of a lower 
current yield. In that way, superstar markets are like growth stocks in the equity 
investment universe.
C. Ex ante versus ex post Definitions of Superstar Status
As a robustness check, we redefined our proxy for superstar status using ex ante 
MSA characteristics rather than ex post realizations of price and quantity growth. 
The model in Section I implies that it is a combination of supply inelasticity and 
high demand for the location that defines superstar status. Our ex ante definition 
of an inelastically supplied MSA is one that is in the top decile of Saiz’s (2010) 
topography-based measure of the difficulty of building. We have two approaches to 
defining “high-demand” based on ex ante data. For one, we denote the top third of 
MSAs ranked by the sum of their price and housing unit growth in the pre-sample 
period of 1950 –1970 as high-demand. In the other, we denote the top third of MSAs 
ranked by their mean January temperature as high-demand. Including our baseline 
definitions, we had two proxies for the elasticity of supply and three proxies for high 
demand. We replicated all the MSA-level specifications using each of the six combi-
nations of these definitions, with the exception of panel C of Table 2. Since neither 
the Saiz (2010) elasticity measure nor the ex ante high-demand proxies are time-
varying, we could not use combinations of these variables to estimate the effect of 
changing superstar status.
In Table 5, we report the estimated coefficients corresponding to the two combi-
nations that used only the three new ex ante definitions. The alternative definitions 
yield lower estimates than in our baseline results, but they remain economically 
and statistically meaningful. The estimates from the specifications corresponding to 
panel A of Table 2 are reported in the top panel of Table 5. Each row corresponds 
to a different construction of superstar status. Superstar MSAs exhibit higher house 
prices—about the same magnitudes as in Table 2—and a right-shift in the income 
distribution that is about half the magnitude of that reported in Table 2. The bot-
tom panel of Table 5 estimates the effect of growth in the national number of rich 
households on the newly defined superstar MSAs, akin to panel A of Table 3. These 
estimates are typically 40 to 50 percent lower in magnitude than in our baseline 
estimates, but they are still economically and statistically significant. For example, 
in the first row of the bottom panel, the estimated coefficient in the regression of 
log house value on the interaction of superstar status with the log number of rich 
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households nationally is 0.2685 (0.0361). This estimated coefficient implies that 
the 160 percent increase in the national number rich between 1970 and 2000 would 
yield a 43 percent increase in house prices in superstar cities, or about 57 percent of 
the actual growth. In the third column, the estimated coefficient of 0.0836 (0.0144) 
corresponds to a 13 percent greater increase in log mean income for superstar MSAs 
over the same time period.
IV. Conclusion
This paper argues that much of the growing dispersion in house prices in the 
post-World War II era is the consequence of aggregate population growth and the 
skewing of incomes nationally interacting with preferences for location and differ-
ences in local supply conditions. This combination of conditions has generated an 
important economic and social phenomenon. Because high house prices dispropor-
tionately crowd out lower income potential residents, the evolution of entire met-
ropolitan areas into superstars influences the way we spatially organize our society. 
Mere population growth forces residency in preferred cities and towns effectively 
to be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with existing landowners in those places 
benefitting from the rise in prices. In contrast to the standard urban growth analysis, 
the house price growth in superstar cities that we describe is not due to an increasing 
service flow or greater productivity.
Although our analysis does not rule out a role for other factors such as persis-
tent differences in local productivity, we provide empirical evidence at the MSA 
Table 5—Robustness to Alternative Definitions of Superstar
Construction of  Superstar i 
log 
house 
value
log tenth 
percentile 
house value
log 
mean 
income
Share of MSA families in the ____ category
Rich Middle rich Middle Middle poor Poor
Panel A. right-hand-side variable:  Superstar i (corresponds to panel A of Table 2)
Saiz (2010) supply elasticity + 
 January temp
0.5101
(0.0965)
0.6349
(0.1264)
0.1023
(0.0381)
0.0174
(0.0054)
[0.524]
0.0134
(0.0045)
[0.380]
0.0198
(0.0092)
[0.153]
− 0.0182
(0.0049)
[− 0.045]
− 0.0325
(0.0187)
[− 0.081]
Saiz (2010) supply elasticity + 
 price growth 1950 –70
0.5690
(0.0886)
0.7539
(0.1091)
0.1196
(0.0373)
0.0185
(0.0055)
[0.556]
0.0145
(0.0045)
[0.411]
0.0230
(0.0092)
[0.178]
− 0.0097
(0.0069)
[− 0.024]
− 0.0464
(0.0186)
[− 0.115]
Fixed effects Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
Panel B. right-hand-side variable:  Superstar i × log(#  rich kt ) (corresponds to panel A of Table 3)
Saiz (2010) supply elasticity +
 January temp
0.2685
(0.0361)
0.1093
(0.0568)
0.0836
(0.0144)
0.0239
(0.0024)
[0.717]
0.0144 
(0.0024)
[0.407]
− 0.0043 
(0.0035)
[− 0.033]
− 0.0168
(0.0070)
[− 0.042]
− 0.0171
(0.0089)
[− 0.043]
Saiz (2010) supply elasticity + 
 price growth 1950 –70
0.3026
(0.0367)
0.1217
(0.0580)
0.0938
(0.0147)
0.0253
(0.0025)
[0.760]
0.0159 
(0.0025)
[0.451]
− 0.0018 
(0.0036)
[− 0.014]
− 0.0156
(0.0072)
[− 0.039]
− 0.0239
(0.0091)
[− 0.059]
Fixed effects MSA,  
year
MSA,  
year
MSA,  
year
MSA,  
year
MSA,  
year
MSA,  
year
MSA,  
year
MSA,  
year
Mean of LHS 11.54 10.64 10.84 0.033 0.035 0.129 0.400 0.402
notes: Number of observations is 1,116, for four decades (1970 –2000) and 279 MSAs. Standard errors are in parentheses. The spec-
ification in the first panel is  y it =  β 1 Supersta r i +  δ t +  ε it , where the superstar variable is defined at the MSA level and is not time-
varying. The specification in the second panel is  y it =  β 1  Superstar i × ln(#  rich t ) +  γ i +  δ t +  ε it , where an indicator variable 
for an MSA ever being a “superstar” during the entire 1970 –2000 period is interacted with the log national number of families in 
the “rich” category. The uninteracted variables are subsumed by the fixed effects. Marginal effects relative to the mean of the LHS 
variable are in square brackets.
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and census place geographies that is consistent with the superstar cities mechanism 
described above being one of the key forces in effect. Our data suggests that as 
much as two-thirds of the growth in dispersion in house prices, and almost all of the 
growth in dispersion in average incomes between superstar MSAs and others over 
the 1970 –2000 period, can be explained by the increase in high-income households 
at the national level.
Our framework also helps us understand the conditions under which widening 
dispersion in house prices may or may not continue. For the superstars mechanism 
to be operative, metropolitan areas must be differentiated and in limited supply, and 
there must be growth in aggregate housing demand. If cities that are close substi-
tutes to a superstar city can be created, the superstar location effectively has a higher 
supply elasticity and the superstar effect would be smaller. Similarly, an increase 
in the elasticity of supply in a superstar city itself also would attenuate its excess 
price growth. Our results imply that despite increasing prices over the last 50 years, 
close substitutes to superstar cities have either failed to arise or have not grown fast 
enough to fully offset the superstar effect.
Our model does suggest two other factors that could affect the superstar mecha-
nism. First, household preferences could shift significantly away from a superstar 
location. Second, superstar cities are sensitive to changes in aggregate demand. 
When housing demand increases, superstar cities and suburbs achieve dispropor-
tionate growth in house prices and changes in their income distributions. When 
housing demand contracts, the opposite should be true. The Great Recession 
reminds us that aggregate growth can falter substantially, both in terms of income 
increases and household formation. It is the waxing and waning of these factors 
which seem most likely to determine whether superstar cities maintain the same 
high long-run house price growth over the next 50 years as they did over the previ-
ous 5 decades.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 1– 4
PROPOSITION 1: rent and the average wage are higher in B than in A.
PROOF:
Let E( w B ) denote the average wage in B. By the law of iterated expectations, the 
average wage in B is given by
(1)  E( w B ) = E[E[  w i |  w i ≥  w _( c i )]].
The innermost calculation E[ w i |  w i ≥  w _( c i )] gives the expected wages for all 
agents whose wages exceed the threshold  w _( c i ).
(2)  E[ w i |  w i ≥  w _( c i )] =  ∫ 0 
∞
 f ( w i |  w i ≥  w _( c i )) w i d w i 
  =  ∫ 
 w _( c i )
 
∞
  
 w i f ( w i ) __  
1 − F( w _( c i ))
 d  w i .
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Taking the expectation over all possible thresholds,  w _( c i ) gives the mean wages 
of all agents who have optimally sorted into B:
(3)  E( w B ) = E[E[ w i |  w i ≥  w _( c i )]] =  ∫ 0 
1
  [  ∫  w _( c i ) ∞   w i f ( w i ) __  1 − F( w _( c i )) d  w i ] h( c i ) d c i .
We now make use of the fact that rents are higher in B than in A. In particular, rents 
in B are r and rents in A are set to zero. To show that mean wages are higher in B, 
it suffices to show that E[  w  B ] is an increasing function of rents,  dE[ w 
B ]
 _dr  > 0. Before 
continuing with the next step of the proof, introduce the following simplification in 
our notation  w _( c i ) ≡  w _. By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we obtain the 
following result:
(4)   
∂E[ w B ]
 _
∂r
  =  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  f ( w _) _  [1 − F( w _) ] 2   ( ∂ w _ _∂r  )  ∫  w _ 
∞
 f ( w i ) w i d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  −  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  f ( w _) w _ _ 1 − F( w _)  ( ∂ w _ _∂r  ) ] h( c i ) d c i 
  ≥  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  f ( w _) _  [1 − F( w _) ] 2   ( ∂ w _ _∂r  )  ∫  w _ 
∞
 f ( w i ) w _ d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  −  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  f ( w _) w _ _ 1 − F( w _)  ( ∂ w _ _∂r  ) ] h( c i ) d c i 
  ≥  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  f ( w _) w _ _  [1 − F( w _) ] 2   ( ∂ w _ _∂r  )  ∫  w _ 
∞
 f ( w i ) d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  −  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  f ( w _) w _ _ 1 − F( w _) ( ∂ w _ _∂r  ) ] h( c i ) d c i 
  ≥ 0.
The inequality introduced in the second step of this computation comes from the 
fact that  w i ∈ [  w _ , ∞ ) is bounded below by  w _ ≥ 0 and the wage cutoff is increasing 
in the rental price  ( ∂ w _ _∂r  ) > 0 (Corollary 2).
PROPOSITION 2: The share of individuals that are high income is higher in B than 
in A.
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PROOF:
Without loss of generality we fix a level of wealth,  w H , such that agents with 
earnings  w i ≥  w H are considered to be high-income individuals. The share of 
 high-income individuals in B,  S H, B is given by
(5)   S H, B = E[ Pr( w i ≥  w H |  w i ≥  w _( c i ))] 
 =  ∫ 
0
 
1
 Pr( w i ≥  w H |  w i ≥  w _( c i ))h ( c i ) d c i .
The conditional probability in equation (5) is given by
Pr( w i ≥  w H |  w i ≥  w _( c i ))
  
=
 ⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
 
Pr( w i ≥ max( w H ,  w _))  __ 
1 − F( w _)
  , if  w i ≥ max( w _,  w H )
⎫
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎭
.
0, else
First we define  c H ≡  c _( w H ). By Corollary 2,  c i ≤  c H ⇔  w _( c i ) ≥  w _( c H ). By 
Corollary 1,  w _( c H ) =  w _( c _( w H )) =  w H . We use these derived taste cutoffs to rewrite 
the conditional probability as
Pr( w i ≥  w H |  w i ≥  w _( c i )) = 
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
 
1 − F( w H )  _
1 − F( w _)
  , if  c i ≥  c H 
⎫
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎭
.
1, if  c i <  c H 
We use this result to simplify the expression in equation (5) for  S H, B :
(6)   S H,B =  ∫ 0 
 c H 
 h( c i ) d c i +  ∫  c H  
1
  
1 − F( w H )  _
1 − F( w _)
  h( c i ) d c i 
 ≥ H( c H ).
In the second to the last step, we use the fact that  c H ≤ 1 ⇒  w _(1) ≤  w _( c H ). In the 
final step, we use  w _(1) =  r − α _β  .
For the second part of the proof, we compute  S H, A , the share of high-income indi-
viduals in city A, which is given by the following expression:
(7)   S H, A = E[Pr( w i ≥  w H | w i ≤  w _( c i ))] 
   =  ∫ 
0
 
1
 Pr( w i ≥  w H |  w i ≤  w _( c i )) h ( c i ) d c i .
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The conditional probability in equation (7) is given by
Pr( w i ≥  w H |  w i <  w _( c i ))
  
=
 ⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
 
Pr( w H ≤  w i <  w _)  __ 
F( w _)
  , if  w H ≤  w i ≤  w _
⎫
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎭
.
0, else
By Corollary 2,  w H ≤  w i ≤  w _( c i ) ⇔  c H ≥  c _( w i ) ≥  c i , which reduces to  c i ≤  c H . 
Rewriting the conditional probability we obtain
Pr( w i ≥  w H |  w i <  w _( c i )) = 
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
1 −  
F( w H ) _
F( w _)
  , if  c i ≤  c H 
⎫
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎭0, if  c i <  c H 
(8)   S H, A =  ∫ 0 
 c H 
  [ 1 −  F( w H ) _F( w _)  ] h( c i ) d c i 
  = H( c H ) −  ∫ 0 
 c H 
  [ F( w H ) _F( w _)  ] h( c i ) d c i 
  ≤ H( c H ).
Comparing  S H, B , the share of high-income individuals in B from equation (6) with 
S H, A , the share of high-income individuals in A from equation (8), we find that there 
is a weakly greater share of high-income individuals in B than in A:
(9)   S H, A ≤ H( c H ) ≤  S H, B .
When  c H > 0, or equally  w H >  r − α _1 + β  , this inequality in is strict and  S H, A <  S H,B . 
If  w H <  r − α _1 + β  then by Lemma 1 everyone in B is classified as high income since 
 w H <  r − α _β  . Consequently  S H, B = 1 and the inequality is again strict.
PROPOSITION 3: Aggregate population growth causes rent growth in B and the 
effect is increasing in the inelasticity of housing supply.
PROOF:
First let n be the aggregate population and  n B be the number of agents living in 
B. We then define a binary variable  D i such that  D i = 1 if individual i lives in B and 
D i = 0 if individual i lives in A. The number of agents living in B is then given by 
n B = n × E[  D i ]. The proof proceeds in two steps. First we solve for E[ D ] using 
the law of iterated expectations, i.e., E[ D ] = E[ E[ D | c ]] and set that equal to the 
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capacity in B at the equilibrium rental rate r. Second, we differentiate this expres-
sion with respect to r and solve out for  ∂r _ ∂n in order to show that it is positive.
(10)  E[ D |  c i ] = Pr[  w i ≥  w _( c i )] = 1 − F( w _( c i )).
Now, by the law of iterated expectations,
(11)   E[ D ] =  ∫ 
0
 
1
 E[ D |  c i ]h( c i ) d c i =  ∫ 0 
1
 [1 − F( w _)]h( c i ) d c i = 1 −  ∫ 0 
1
 F( w _)h( c i ) d c i .
Hence the number of individuals living in B is given by
(12)  n  ( 1 −  ∫ 
0
 
1
 F( w _)h( c i ) d c i ) = K(r).
Differentiating equation (12) with respect to r yields
(13)   dn _
dr
   ( 1 −  ∫ 
0
 
1
 F( w _)h( c i ) d c i ) − n  ∫ 0 
1
  [  f ( w _)  ∂ w _ _∂r   ] h( c i ) d c i =  dK _dr  .
Rearranging this equation into the desired form:
  
 dr _ r  _ 
 dn _
n
  
 =  1  ___  
 
 dK _ 
K ( r ) 
 
 _
 dr _ r 
  +  
r  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  f ( w _)  ∂ w _ _∂r  ] h( c i ) d c i 
  _   
1 −  ∫ 
0
 
1
 F( w _)h( c i ) d c i 
  
 .
The manipulation in the second line above comes inserting the definition of 
equation  (12). The change of integration limits in the third line come from the 
assumption that f (w) has support on w ∈ [0, ∞). Setting  w _( c i ) ≥ 0 ⇒  c i ≥  1 _ 1 + β . 
Since  dK _dr  > 0 by assumption (i.e., higher capacity is offered for a higher market 
clearing rent, and  ∂ w _ _∂r  > 0 by Corollary 2, we obtain  
 dr _ r  _ 
 dn _n  
 > 0. In particular,  
 dr _ r  _ 
 dn _n  
 is 
decreasing in the elasticity of supply  
 dK _K   _
 dr _ r 
  .
COROLLARY 3.1: Aggregate population growth results in an increase in the aver-
age wage of agents choosing to live in B.
PROOF:
The wage cutoff for living in B is increasing with aggregate population growth, 
i.e.,  
d w _( c i ) dn  =  
 c i  _ (1 + β c i ) − 1  
dr _ dn ≥ 0. This follows from the fact that  
dr _ dn > 0 and the 
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minimum taste cutoff for agents living in B is  c _min =  1 _ 1 + β , both of which are shown 
in Proposition 3. The proof that  
∂E[ w B ]
 _∂n  follows via a similar computation to the one 
in equation (4), with n taking the place of B.
PROPOSITION 4: A more skewed aggregate wage distribution with a thicker right 
tail leads to higher wages and rents in B.
PROOF:
Let F(w) and G(w) denote two nonidentical wage cdfs with common support 
w ∈ [0, ∞), where F(w) first order stochastically dominates G(w). First order stochas-
tic dominance of F over G captures the fact that F has a thicker right tail than G, i.e., 
∫ a 
∞ f ( w i ) d  w i ≥  ∫ a 
∞ g( w i ) d w i ∀  w i and  ∫ a 
∞ f ( w i ) d w i >  ∫ a 
∞ g( w i ) d w i for some  w i . Let 
E F [  w  B ] denote the expected wage of individuals in B under the wage distribution F, 
and  E G [  w  B ] the expected wage of individuals in B under the wage distribu-
tion G. We now show that  E F [  w  B |  c i ] ≥  E G [  w  B |  c i ] ∀ c i ∈ [0, 1], which implies 
E F [  w  B ] ≥  E G [  w  B ]. As in Proposition  3, we define a binary variable  D i such that 
D i = 1 if individual i lives in B and  D i = 0 if individual i lives in A. Taking the 
conditional expectation of D under the wage distributions F and G yields  E F [D |  c i ] 
= 1 − F( w _( c i )) and  E G [D |  c i ] = 1 − G( w _( c i )). By first order stochastic dominance 
of F over G,  E F [D |  c i ] >  E G [D |  c i ]. Moreover, by the intermediate value theorem 
∃   w( c i ) ∈ [0,  w _( c i )] such that F( w _( c i )) = G(  w( c i )) ≤ G( w _( c i )). Using this result in 
concert with the definition of the conditional wage functions given in equation (3), 
we complete the proof as follows:
   E F [  w  B ] −  E G [  w  B ] =  ∫ 0 
1
  [  ∫  w _( c i ) ∞   w i f ( w i ) __  1 − F( w _( c i )) d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  −  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  ∫  w _( c i ) ∞   w i g( w i ) __  1 − G( w _( c i )) d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  =  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  ∫  w _( c i ) ∞   w i f ( w i ) __  1 − G(  w( c i )) d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  −  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  ∫  w _( c i ) ∞   w i g( w i ) __  1 − G( w _( c i )) d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  ≥  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  ∫  w _( c i ) ∞   w i f ( w i ) __  1 − G(  w( c i )) d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  −  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  ∫  w _( c i ) ∞   w i g( w i ) __  1 − G(  w( c i )) d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  ≥  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [ ∫  w _ ∞   w i f ( w i ) −  w i g( w i )  _[1 − G(  w( c i ))]  d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
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  ≥  ∫ 
0
 
1
  [  1 __ [1 − G(  w( c i ))] ∫  w _ 
∞
 ( w i f ( w i ) −  w i g( w i )) d w i ] h( c i ) d c i 
  > 0.
Since  E F [  w B ] −  E G [  w B ] > 0, it follows directly that  E F [  w B ] ≥  E G [  w B ]. We now 
show that  r F , the equilibrium rent under the wage distribution F(w) is greater than 
r G , the equilibrium rent under the wage distribution G(w). Using the result in equa-
tion (12), the equilibrium rents  r F and  r G are given by
(15)  K( r F ) = n  ( 1 −  ∫ 0 
1
 F( w _)h( c i ) d c i ) 
(16)  K( r G ) = n  ( 1 −  ∫ 0 
1
 G( w _)h( c i ) d c i ) .
Applying the first order stochastic dominance condition to equation (16), we obtain
(17)  K( r F ) = n  ( 1 −  ∫ 0 
1
 F( w _)h( c i ) d c i ) 
  > n  ( 1 −  ∫ 
0
 
1
 G( w _)h( c i ) d c i ) 
  = K( r G ) > K( r G ).
Since K(r) is an increasing function of r, K( r F ) > K( r G ) ⇔  r F >  r G . This completes 
the second part of Proposition 4.
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Table A1—MSA Summary Statistics
Mean SD
MSA time-invariant characteristics (n = 279)
 Average annual real house price growth, 1950 –2000 1.57 0.56
 Average annual housing unit growth, 1950 –2000 2.10 0.98
 Average annual real income growth, 1950 –2000 1.82 0.35
 Ever a “superstar” 0.075 0.264
 Ever “low demand” 0.738 0.440
MSA time-varying characteristics (n = 1,116)
 Average 20-year real house price growth 1.50 1.04
 Average 20-year housing unit growth 2.10 1.20
 Average 20-year house price growth + housing unit growth 3.60 1.86
 Average ratio of 20-year price growth to 20-year unit growth 0.869 1.148
 Real house value 111,329 54,889
 Average price/average annual rent 17.00 3.99
Number of “superstars”
1970 0
1980 2
1990 21
2000 20
income distribution
 Share of an MSA’s population that is “rich” 0.033 0.021
 Share “middle rich” 0.035 0.024
 Share “middle” 0.129 0.043
 Share “middle poor” 0.400 0.050
 Share “poor” 0.402 0.095
National number “rich”
1970 1,571,136
1980 1,312,103
1990 2,611,178
2000 4,098,324
Table A2—Place Summary Statistics
Mean SD
Place time-invariant characteristics (n = 3,788)
 Average real house price growth (1970 –2000) 0.015 0.011
 Average housing unit growth (1970 –2000) 0.017 0.019
 Average real income growth (1970 –2000) 0.007 0.007
 Ever a “superstar” 0.220 0.414
 Ever “low demand” 0.618 0.486
Place time-varying characteristics: (1990 –2000; n = 7,576)
 Average 20-year real house price growth 0.015 0.017
 Average 20-year housing unit growth 0.016 0.021
 Average 20-year house price growth + housing unit growth 0.031 0.028
 Mean real house value 156,736 125,401
 10th percentile house value 90,757 79,123
 Average price/average annual rent 17.76 7.60
# “superstars”
1990 653
2000 580
(continued)
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Table A3—Superstar MSAs by Year
City name 1970 1980 1990 2000
Albany X X
Allentown X
Atlantic City X
Baltimore X
Bellingham X
Bergen-Passaic X X
Boston X X
Bremerton X
Detroit X
Dutchess County X X
Enid X
Glens Falls X
Hartford X
Jersey City X X
Lewiston X
Los Angeles X X
Louisville X
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon X
Nassau-Suffolk County X X
New Haven X X
New London X X
Newark X X
Oakland X X
Orange County X
Philadelphia X X
Pine Bluff X
Pittsfield X X
Portland X
Providence X X
Reading X
Salinas X X
San Francisco X X X
San Jose X X
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria X X
Santa Cruz X X
Springfield, MA X X
Trenton X X
Ventura X
notes: 241 MSAs that are never superstars are excluded from the table. Rows shaded in grey 
correspond to MSAs that achieve superstar status in two or more decades. This subset of MSAs 
are defined as superstars in our regression analysis. The empirical results are robust to defining 
all MSAs in this table as superstars. Expanding the definition yields slightly lower magnitudes 
of the estimated coefficients and slightly larger standard errors, but the results remain economi-
cally and statistically significant.
Table A2—Place Summary Statistics (continued)
Mean SD
income distribution (1990–2000)
Share of a place’s population that is “rich” 0.061 0.035
Share “middle rich” 0.069 0.030
Share “middle” 0.174 0.041
Share “middle poor” 0.372 0.039
Share “poor” 0.323 0.085
MSA number “rich”
1990 26,789 36,031
2000 39,582 49,513
voL. 5 no. 4 199Gyourko Et al.: SupErStar CitiES
REFERENCES
Baum-Snow, Nathaniel, and Ronni Pavan. Forthcoming. “Inequality and City Size.” review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics.
Eeckhout, Jan, Roberto Pinheiro, and Kurt Schmidheiny. 2010. “Spatial Sorting: Why New York, Los 
Angeles and Detroit Attract the Greatest Minds as Well as the Unskilled.” http://www.princeton.
edu/~erossi/CURE2010/Spatial_Sorting.pdf.
Epple, Dennis, and Glenn J. Platt. 1998. “Equilibrium and Local Redistribution in an Urban Economy 
when Households Differ in both Preferences and Incomes.” Journal of urban Economics 43 (1): 
23–51.
Epple, Dennis, and Holger Sieg. 1999. “Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions.” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 107 (4): 645–81.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Joseph Gyourko. 2005. “Urban Decline and Durable Housing.” Journal of 
Political Economy 113 (2): 345–75.
Glaeser, Edward, and Kristina Tobio. 2008. “The Rise of the Sunbelt.” Southern Economic Journal 
74 (3): 610–43.
Gyourko, Joseph, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai. 2013. “Superstar Cities: Dataset.” American 
Economic Journals: Economic Policy. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.4.167.
Gyourko, Joseph, and Albert Saiz. 2006. “Construction Costs and the Supply of Housing Structure.” 
Journal of regional Science 46 (4): 661–80.
Gyourko, Joseph, Albert Saiz, and Anita Summers. 2008. “A New Measure of the Local Regulatory 
Environment for Housing Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index.” urban 
Studies 45 (3): 693–729.
Lee, Sanghoon. 2010. “Ability sorting and consumer city.” Journal of urban Economics 68 (1): 20–33.
Meese, Richard, and Nancy Wallace. 1994. “Testing the Present Value Relation for Housing Prices: 
Should I Leave My House in San Francisco?” Journal of urban Economics 35 (3): 245–66.
Moretti, Enrico. 2011. “Real Wage Inequality.” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Working Paper 14370.
Ortalo-Magné, François, and Andrea Prat. 2011. “On the Political Economy of Urban Growth: Home-
ownership Versus Affordability.” Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper 
DP8243.
Ortalo-Magné, François, and Sven Rady. 2008. “Heterogeneity within communities: A stochastic 
model with tenure choice.” Journal of urban Economics 64 (1): 1–17.
Paciorek, Andrew. Forthcoming. “Supply constraints and housing market dynamics.” Journal of urban 
Economics.
Roback, Jennifer. 1982. “Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life.” Journal of Political Economy 90 (6): 
1257–78.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1979. “Wage-Based Indexes of Urban Quality of Life.” In current issues in urban 
Economics, edited by Peter Mieszkowski and Mahlon Straszheim, 74–104. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins Univerity Press.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1981. “The Economics of Superstars.” American Economic review 71 (5): 845–58.
Rosenthal, Stuart S., and William C. Strange. 2003. “Geography, Industrial Organization, and Agglom-
eration.” review of Economics and Statistics 85 (2):  377–93.
Saiz, Albert. 2010. “The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply.” Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 125 (3): 1253–96.
Sinai, Todd, and Nicholas S. Souleles. 2005. “Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge Against Rent 
Risk.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2): 763–89.
Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, and Pierre-Olivier Weill. 2010. “Why Has House Price Dispersion Gone 
Up?” review of Economic Studies 77 (4): 1567–1606.
Waldfogel, Joel. 2003. “Preference Externalities: An Empirical Study of Who Benefits Whom in Dif-
ferentiated-Product Markets.” rAnD Journal of Economics 34 (3): 557–68.
This article has been cited by:
1. Giovanni Favara, Jean Imbs. 2015. Credit Supply and the Price of Housing. American Economic
Review 105:3, 958-992. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
2. Elliot Anenberg, Edward Kung. 2014. Estimates of the Size and Source of Price Declines Due
to Nearby Foreclosures. American Economic Review 104:8, 2527-2551. [Abstract] [View PDF
article] [PDF with links]
